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We use a new plant-level dataset to study the effect of two reforms aimed at
increasing product market competition in India – liberalization of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and reduction in tariff rates. First, we examine the effect of the
liberalization policies on mean plant-level productivity in the liberalized indus-
tries. We find a 23% increase in productivity level following the FDI liberalization
and a 33% increase following tariff liberalization (comparing mean value added
log productivity levels in 1994-95 to the pre-reform 1987-90 period). We check
the robustness of these results to: (a) using alternative measures of productivity;
(b) using alternative definitions of the liberalization variable; and (c) inclusion of
controls to address possible bias from the selection of industries into liberalization
regimes. The tariff liberalization effect is generally robust; the FDI liberalization
effect is 14%-16% when controlling for non-random selection. Next, we examine
aggregate productivity growth in liberalized industries; we find a 16% (15.6%) in-
crease following FDI (tariff) liberalization. This increase appears to be driven by
improvement in intra-plant productivity growth, with a small role for re-allocation.
Finally, we examine who benefitted from the productivity gains; we find that the
major beneficiaries were wholesale consumers (in the form of relatively lower whole-
sale output prices in the liberalized sectors).
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I Introduction
In the last couple of decades, many countries have dramatically altered their regulatory
regimes by abandoning “import substitution” policies and embracing pro-competitive, open-
market policies (e.g., Chile in the late 1970s, Turkey in 1983, Mexico in 1985, India in 1991).
Driven by multilateral agreements under the World Trade Organization, and by programs
supported by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, policies reducing barriers to the flow of goods and capital continue to be adopted
around the world. However, such policies have come under criticism from various quarters.
Recent research (e.g., Easterly [2003]) has questioned the importance of such policies in
explaining growth trends in developing countries. These policies have been critiqued in the
context of crises in countries that had adopted these policies (e.g., in south-east Asia in the
late 90s, and recently in Argentina and Bolivia). Capital and trade liberalization has also
been the target of attacks by various ‘anti-globalization’ groups, with an important criticism
being that the benefits from such liberalization have not been widely shared.1
Structural reform measures introduced in India in 1991 provide an excellent opportunity to
use micro-data to evaluate the benefits from trade and investment liberalization policies. We
use a previously unexplored, rich plant-level dataset, with annual data on about 40,000 plants
covering the entire Indian (formal) manufacturing sector, to examine the impact on total
factor productivity of two sets of reforms: (i) liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI)
into certain industries, and (ii) widespread reduction in tariff rates, with larger reductions
in certain industries.2
The manner of implementation of the Indian reforms and the availability of rich micro-
data provide a special opportunity to study these types of policy changes and contribute
to the literature in many ways. One, FDI and tariff liberalization was applied selectively
to certain industries. This quasi-experimental nature of the reforms allows us to use a
difference-in-difference approach that controls for contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks.
Hence, we are able to avoid a key weakness of early studies of trade liberalization (Pavcnik
[2002]).3 Two, the availability of a detailed and comprehensive plant-level dataset allows us to
undertake industry-level analysis at a much finer level than for most other countries. Hence,
unlike previous studies, we are able to directly address changes in aggregate productivity
and investigate the role of reallocation of resources in reform-related aggregate productivity
changes.4 The data also allows us to investigate the question of who benefits from the post-
1One of the definitions of the term “globalization” is ‘a process of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements
between countries in order to create an “open”, “borderless” world economy’ (Scholte [2000], page 16). In this context, this
study can be seen as an examination of the effects of the public policy underpinnings of globalization.
2See section II for our definitions of ‘FDI liberalized’ and ‘tariff liberalized’ industries.
3The policy changes are not ideal “natural experiments”, since industries were not randomly selected for liberalization. We
try to carefully address possible biases arising from the non-random selection of industries in Section B.4.
4As pointed out by (Nickell [1996]), by focussing solely on changes in mean intra-plant productivity we may miss the effect
of re-allocation of resources on aggregate productivity. An important role for re-allocation has been highlighted in empirical
studies of productivity in US manufacturing plants (Foster et al. [1998]) and in recent theoretical work on trade liberalization
(e.g. Melitz [2003]). However no empirical studies of trade liberalization have addressed this question directly [Tybout 2001].
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reform productivity gains, which has been seldom addressed in the productivity literature.
Our study is related to the literature addressing the effects of FDI on firm productivity,
which have found mixed evidence on the effect of entry by foreign direct investors on domestic
firms (see discussion in section III). We also contribute to the literature examining the effects
of trade liberalization on productivity growth. While the early evidence on the effect of
trade liberalization was somewhat mixed (Tybout 1992), recent surveys by Tybout (2000)
and Epifani (2003) conclude that the empirical literature generally support a positive effect
of trade liberalization on productivity. Notable recent works that have found evidence of a
positive effect of trade liberalization on productivity have been Pavcnik (2002) for Chilean
manufacturing firms, Fernandes (2003) for Columbian manufacturing firms and Muendler
(2004) for Brazilian manufacturing firms.5
To analyze the effects of the reforms on productivity (defined in the base-case as the
residual in a production function), we follow a two-stage approach. In the first stage we
estimate a production function by adapting the recently proposed Levinsohn-Petrin (LP)
structural estimation procedure (Levinsohn and Petrin [2003a]) to our repeated cross-section
context. This methodology addresses the issue of simultaneity bias (potential correlation
between inputs and the error term) and hence avoids a potential drawback of earlier studies
of trade reforms (as highlighted by Pavcnik [2002]).
The second stage of our study has three parts, addressing three distinct questions about
the effects of the FDI and tariff liberalization reforms: (i) What was the effect of the re-
forms on mean intra-plant productivity levels ?; (ii) How did the reforms affect aggregate
productivity growth, and what were the roles of reallocation and intra-plant productivity
on changes in aggregate productivity growth?; and (iii) How did changes in productivity
affect potential beneficiaries (suppliers, blue and white collar workers, owners of capital and
consumers), as reflected in changes to output and factor prices?
In the first part of our study, we examine the effects of FDI and tariff liberalization on
intra-plant productivity levels by comparing plants in liberalized industries to those that
5 Two recent papers have examined product market liberalization in India. Topalova (2004) uses a dataset of medium and
large firms to carefully examine the effect of trade liberalization on Indian firms and finds a positive effect of tariff reductions
on productivity. While Topalova’s finding is consistent with this study, our study differs from and extends her study in the
following ways. One, our study focusses significantly on the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization, which is
not examined in Topalova’s study. Two, we use a comprehensive survey of all manufacturing plants, including a large number
of non-publicly owned small plants that are not covered in the Prowess dataset used in the Topalova study. This allows us
to obtain accurate estimates of industry aggregate productivity change, and decompose it to examine micro-economic sources
of aggregate productivity change following FDI and trade liberalization. Three, our data includes figures on white and blue
collar employment, whereas Prowess provides data only on labor expenditure. Our study avoids potential biases arising from
using labor expenditure as a proxy for labor input (which arise if benefits from productivity are shared by workers). Four,
our data extends from 1986-87 to 1994-95, while the Prowess dataset covers the 1989-2001 period. By looking further into the
pre-reform period, we are able to avoid potential biases that could arise because of a temporary economic downturn prior to
the reforms in 1991 (on the flip side, the lack of data for later years prevents us from examining the longer term consequences
of the reforms). Finally, our data allows us to explore the question of who benefits from the observed productivity gains. A
recent study by Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2004) uses industry aggregate data to examine the impact of entry
liberalization (de-licensing) on different industries in India. Consistent with their theoretical predictions, they find that entry
liberalization had a greater positive impact on industries closer to the technology frontier and industries in states with more
flexible labor regulations. They do not attempt to distinguish between the effects of de-licensing (a sweeping reform covering
almost the entire manufacturing sector) from tariff or FDI liberalization; in our study we focus on separately identifying the
effect of tariff and FDI liberalization on micro and aggregate productivity change.
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faced neither reform. Our results suggest an increase in (value-added) log productivity
levels over the long term (ie comparing mean log productivity levels in 1994-95 to levels in
1987-90), of about 23% for firms in FDI liberalized industries and of about 33% for firms
in tariff liberalized industries. This translates to an increase of about 4.5% and 8% in log
productivity in gross output terms following FDI and tariff liberalization respectively.6
We perform a three types of robustness checks on our results. First, to address the concern
that our results may be driven by assumptions underlying the estimation of the production
function, we check the sensitivity of the results to a range of alternative definitions of total
factor productivity, and find our results to be remarkably robust.7 Second, we check and find
that our results are robust to alternative definitions of the FDI and the tariff liberalization
measure.
Third, while our difference-in-difference approach controls for all industry fixed effects and
macroeconomic shocks, the selective application of FDI and tariff liberalization could lead to
bias due to other reasons. We try to control for four possible sources of bias, arising from the
selective liberalization of: (a) industries with strong pre-reform growth in productivity that
may simply be continuing on a pre-reform trend; (b) export-oriented industries that may
have benefitted currency depreciation; (c) capital intensive sectors that may have benefitted
from liberalization of capital imports; and (d) industries relatively farther away from the
frontier that may have had a greater (or lower) scope for improvement. We address these
four sources of bias in two ways. One, we redo our analysis conditioning out the effect
of variables that proxy for each of these four sources of bias. Two, we check robustness to
conditioning on the propensity of being selected for reform (following Rosenbaum and Rubin
[1985]). The propensity score is derived from a selection model that includes proxies for the
four sources of bias, factors highlighted in policy announcements, and variables drawn from
the existing literature on the political economy of such reforms. We find that the tariff
liberalization effect is robust to the inclusion of various controls; the FDI effect changes to
about 16% when controlling for improvements in capital intensive sectors and to about 14%
when conditioning on the propensity scores.
In the second part of this study, we evaluate how the FDI and tariff liberalizations af-
fected aggregate output and productivity growth. We propose a decomposition of aggregate
output growth into contribution from input growth, inter-industry reallocation, intra-plant
6Since value added is only a fraction of gross output, a gross-output augmenting productivity change is a much larger value-
added augmenting productivity change. As shown by Rotemberg and Woodford [1995], log productivity change in value added




where γ is returns to scale and Sm is the share of material in total revenue. In our case, assuming constant returns to scale
and a material share of 0.75 (the mean material share in our sample), we get log productivity change in gross output terms
to be the about one fourth of the value added log productivity change. This is confirmed by our results for the gross output
production function in Table IV(a).
7A recent paper by Van Biesebroeck [2003] investigates alternative productivity estimation methodologies and finds that
many interesting results on productivity change are robust to the choice of methodology. Together with our results, these findings
suggest room for cautious optimism on the severity of the simultaneity bias problem for a range of common applications.
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productivity growth and intra-industry reallocation. We find a difference-in-difference in-
crease in mean industry-level aggregate productivity growth rate of 16% (15.6%) following
FDI (tariff) liberalization (in the 1994-95 period compared to the pre-reform 1987-90 pe-
riod). We find that the increase in the growth rate of intra-plant productivity was the single
largest contributor to increase in aggregate productivity growth, contributing 11.6% in FDI
liberalized industries and about 10.6% in tariff liberalized industries. This suggests that
channels stressed in homogenous firm theories (such as better incentives to reduce slack or
adopt new technologies), may have played a more important role in post-reform productiv-
ity improvements (relative to the predominant role for reallocation stressed in heterogeneous
firm models such as Melitz [2003]).
Finally, in the third part of this study, we briefly examine who benefited from the pro-
ductivity growth following FDI and tariff liberalization. We decompose changes in a Solow
productivity index growth rate to changes in output and various factor prices. Our analy-
sis indicates that the higher productivity (and lower input prices) following the reforms
translated into lower output prices in the liberalized sectors. This implies that the biggest
beneficiaries from the reforms were wholesale consumers, which suggests that the benefits
from productivity gains were widely dispersed.
All our results need to be interpreted cautiously considering a number of caveats driven
by the nature of the reforms and the limitations of our data (discussed in detail in section
VIII). We believe our results are robust to many important concerns that arise for this type of
policy evaluation studies; some factors (e.g., expectation that the reforms would be reversed
or extended to other industries) suggest that our estimates potentially understate the true
impact of the reforms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the key
Indian reforms, and define the key liberalization (dummy) variables. The third section briefly
reviews related literature. We describe our data in section four. In section five, we analyze
mean intra-plant productivity levels. Section six looks at aggregate output and productivity
growth. Section seven examines who benefited from the reforms. Section eight discusses our
results and section nine concludes.
II The Indian reforms
Significant reforms were introduced in 1991 that transitioned India from a closed, socialist
economy to a more open, free-market oriented system. The proximate cause for the reforms
was a severe balance of payments (BOP) crisis in 1991. The origin of the crisis was a rapid
increase in India’s external debt, which coupled with political uncertainty led international
credit rating agencies to lower India’s debt rating. This made borrowing in international
markets difficult and triggered an outflow of foreign currency deposits by non-resident Indi-
ans. The collapse of the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc trading partners, and the spike
in oil prices following the Gulf war, worsened the BOP situation. The Gulf war also led to a
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reduction in repatriation from expatriate workers (an important source of foreign exchange
at that time). These developments brought India to the brink of defaulting on its debt
obligations. In June 1991 a new government came into power following mid-term elections;
this government obtained funding from the international financial institutions (the IMF, the
World Bank and The Asian Development Bank) and initiated a structural adjustment pro-
gramme on the advice of these institutions. In terms of overall macroeconomic trends, the
reforms coincided with a downturn in real output growth (see Figure I).
Underlying the policy shift was also a realization that the existing import-substitution
and FDI unfriendly policies had resulted in a relatively inefficient manufacturing sector with
limited ability to compete in international markets. Accordingly, the key stated goals of the
trade and investment reforms were to: (1) put emphasis on modernization of plants plants
and equipment through liberalized imports of capital goods and technology; (2) expose the
Indian industry to competition by gradually reducing the import restrictions and tariffs;
and (3) assign a greater role to multi-national enterprises in the promotion of manufactured
exports.
In this paper, we focus on the following specific changes in foreign direct investment and
trade policies initiated in July 1991:8
• Foreign direct investment liberalization: Prior to 1991, under the Foreign Ex-
change Regulation Act (1973), various constraints were imposed on foreign companies
operating in India. Foreign ownership rates were restricted to below 40% in most in-
dustries. In addition, restrictions were placed on the use of foreign brand names, on
remittances of dividends abroad and on the proportion of local content in output (under
the Phased Manufacturing Program).
In 1991, foreign direct investors were allowed up to 51% equity stakes in certain in-
dustries (listed in Annexure III of the Statement of Industrial Policy in 1991), under
the “automatic approval route”. Further, restrictions relating to use of foreign brands,
remittances of dividend and local content were relaxed. Following these reforms, there
was a significant increase in amount of foreign direct investment into India (see Figure
II).
To study the effect of lowered entry barriers to foreign investment, we focus on ”An-
nexure III” industries where ownership of 51% was allowed under the automatic route.
These were the sectors into which the government tried to channel foreign investment,
and our analysis of aggregate sector-wise data on foreign investment proposals approved
during August 1991 to December 1994 suggests that 80% of all approved foreign direct
investment in the manufacturing sector in the period August 1991 to 1994 was in these
Annexure III industries.9 We define a dummy equal to one for 4 digit industries where
8For a more extensive discussion of these and other reforms initiated in 1991 and continued through the 90s, refer to Acharya
[2002].
9The Annexure III industries evolved from a list that was originally Appendix 1 of the Industrial Licensing Policy of 1970.
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FDI was allowed up to 51% (under the automatic approval route) to proxy for FDI
liberalization. Hereafter, the terms ‘FDI treated’ or ‘FDI liberalized’ refer to firms (in-
dustries) where this dummy equals one. In section B.3, we check the sensitivity of our
results to a more liberal definition of FDI liberalization.
• Tariff liberalization: Tariff rates were reduced across the board in the early 90s. The
rates dropped from an (unweighted) average of about 85% in 1990 to about 60% in
1992. There was also a devaluation of the rupee by about 41% during the calender
year 1991 (from about Rs 18.4/$ to about Rs 25.8/$), which counteracted the effect
of the tariff reductions on import-competing industries, and gave a boost for firms in
export-oriented industries.
To study the impact of tariff liberalization, we define as ‘tariff liberalized’ (or ‘tariff
treated’) those industries that experienced the steepest declines in tariff rates; specifi-
cally, we define a tariff liberalization dummy equal to one for industries that experienced





) exceeding 33 per cent.
We use a dummy variable instead of the actual tariff drops driven by the limitations
of available tariff data. The data available are unweighted averages of tariff lines,
and hence are crude measures of the tariff rates facing individual firms. We expect
our dummy variable to capture broadly the segment of firms that faced the largest
increase in competitive pressure from imports, adjusting for the devaluation in the
currency. In Section B.3, we present the results from using an alternative measure of
tariff liberalization.
In Table I, we list the largest (by number of plants) industries in each of the three regimes.
About 28.5% of the firms belong to FDI liberalized industries, while around 41% of the firms
belong to sectors we define as tariff liberalized. There is a little overlap between FDI and
tariff liberalization dummies – about about 7.5% of the firms belong to industries that are
both FDI and tariff liberalized under our definition. This low overlap is significant, as it
suggests different industries were targeted for FDI and tariff liberalizations, and helps us to
separately identify the effects of the two reforms. Even though the overlap is small, in order
to separate out the effects of the two reforms, we shall focus on specifications where both
FDI and tariff reform dummies are included.
In 1991 the government also initiated other widespread reforms. One big reform was the
extensive liberalization of licensing requirements for establishing and expanding capacity,
a cornerstone of the pre-91 industrial regulatory regime (which came to be called the “li-
cence raj”). Other pro-market macroeconomic policies initiated in 1991 included moves to
reduce the fiscal deficit, liberalization of technology and capital goods imports, devaluation
This Appendix 1 was a list of ”Core Industries” introduced to limit the investment activity of large Indian companies and all
foreign companies. This list was expanded under the Industrial Licensing Policy of 1973 and again in 1982.
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of the local currency, transition to a market determined exchange rate and liberalization
of capital markets. Since these reforms were pervasive and announced simultaneously, we
adopt a difference-in-differences approach in order to identify the effects of the FDI and tariff
liberalization reforms.
Our results may be biased if our key identifying assumption that de-licensing and other
pervasive reforms had the same effect on the FDI and tariff liberalized industries as they had
on the non-liberalized sectors, does not hold. Further, the non-random selection of industries
for liberalization could lead to biased estimates of the effects of the reforms. In section B.4,
we try to control for the possible differential impact of some of the concurrent reforms (such
as devaluation and liberalization of capital goods imports) on particular industries, and for
other potential biases introduced by non-random selection into liberalization regimes.
III Related literature
We briefly examine the literature relating FDI and trade liberalization to productivity
change, and highlight the contributions of this study (see Tybout 2000, or Epifani 2003
for excellent surveys).
The literature examining the effect of FDI on productivity has generally focused on identi-
fying the relative productivity of foreign firms and on evaluating whether there are spillovers
from foreign firms to local firms. The evidence on spillovers is mixed, with some evidence
of a negative effect of foreign presence on domestic firms in the same industry (Aitken and
Harrison [1999]) while more recent studies find a positive effect (see survey in Keller [2004]).
We focus here on the effect of FDI liberalization on all plants; irrespective of the sign of
the spillover effect, liberalization of FDI regulations could affect productivity even without
actual entry by foreign firms. The reduction in entry barriers to multi-national companies
could force incumbents to cut slack or adopt newer technologies. The quasi-experimental na-
ture of FDI liberalization in India permits us to try to identify the direct effect of a reduction
in barriers to FDI.
As discussed in Tybout (2000) theoretical papers have argued for both a positive as
well as negative impact of trade liberalization on productivity. Liberalization could improve
productivity since trade protection allows inefficient firms to survive or entices inefficient pro-
ducers to enter or survive (e.g., Krugman 1979, Melitz 2004), providing incentives (through
increased competition) to cut slack (e.g., Schmidt 1997) or adopt new technologies (e.g.
Aghion et al 1999), and providing new channels of knowledge transmission (e.g., Grossman
and Helpman 1991) . Arguments for a positive effect of trade protection include provid-
ing greater incentives for marginal cost reductions (e.g. Rodrik 1992), providing incentives
for high tech activities where learning-by-doing is important (e.g., Grossman and Helpman
1991), or providing better incentives (by reducing competition) to cut slack (Scharfstein
1988) or adopt new technologies (Aghion and Howitt 1992). Thus the net effect of trade
liberalization is an empirical question.
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We contribute to the empirical literature on trade liberalization and productivity by
addressing some of the drawbacks the literature, highlighted in the survey by Tybout [2001].
Early studies attempted to identify the effect of trade openness by comparing more versus
less protected industries using cross-sectional data. This is problematic as protection rates
are endogenous in the long run. Other studies (e.g., Tybout and Westbrook [1995], Krishna
and Mitra [1998]) try to identify the effects of trade by comparing the performance of plants
before and after a trade liberalization. However, these studies are unable to separate the
effects of trade reform from other macro-economic changes, which is especially problematic
because many trade liberalizations are undertaken soon after an economic downturn (Epifani
[2003]). Another problem with many of the earlier studies is that they did not address the
issue of simultaneity bias (which arises because the choice of inputs may be correlated with
the error term in the production function) while estimating production functions (Pavcnik
2002).10
Our study attempts to addresses all of these concerns. The nature of the Indian tariff and
FDI liberalization allows us to adopt a difference-in-differences methodology that controls
for the effect of concurrent macro-economic changes. Further, we adopt methodologies to
address potential simultaneity bias while estimating the production function.11
Early studies of the 1991 Indian reforms generally focused on a few selected industries and
come to contrasting conclusions of the effect of trade reform on productivity (e.g. Krishna
and Mitra [1998] find a positive effect of trade liberalization, while Balakrishnan et al [2000]
find a negative effect; see review by Epifani [2003]). These studies examine before-after
effects that are potentially confounded by macro-economic shocks, and do not identify the
effects of particular reforms. Two recent studies that carefully examine liberalization in
India are Topalova’s (2004) study of tariff liberalization and Aghion, Burgess, Redding and
Zilibotti’s (2005) study of entry liberalization. (Refer footnote 5 for a discussion of these
works in relation to our study.)
Finally, to our knowledge, ours is the first study to examines the effect trade and FDI
liberalization policies on aggregate productivity growth12, and to address the question of
who gains or loses from liberalization induced productivity changes.
10More recent studies, such as Pavcnik (2002), Topalova (2004) and Fernandes (2003) use methodologies to address these
drawbacks in the earlier literature.
11A third potential bias highlighted by Pavcnik [2002] is caused because exiting plants are ignored in most studies. The
nature of our data precludes us from identifying exiting plants, and hence we are unable to correct for this problem. To the
extent that exiting firms are likely to be only a small fraction of the plants in our sample, the effect of ignoring these plants
while estimating the production function may not be large. Ignoring plant exits is likely to bias the capital coefficient upward;
we check the robustness of our results using different methodologies, which yield a broad range of coefficients on labor and
capital, mitigating the concern that our results may be driven by a biased capital coefficient.
12This gap in the literature is highlighted by Tybout [2001]. While Pavcnik [2002] examines trends in aggregate productivity




The primary data source for this study is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), undertaken
by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), a department in the Ministry of Statistics
and Programme Implementation, Government of India.
The ASI covers all industrial units (called “Factories”) registered under the Factories Act
employing more than 20 persons. The ASI frame comprises all the factories registered with
the Chief Inspector of Factories in each state. Manufacturing activity undertaken in the
informal sector (households (own-account) and unregistered workshops) are not covered by
the ASI. Like other low income countries, India had a large fraction of employment in the
informal sector; according to estimates in Subrahmanya [2003], the employment share of the
formal manufacturing sector was about 21.6% in 1989-90.
The ASI frame is classified into two sectors: the “census sector” and the “sample sector”.
Factories employing more than 100 workers constitute the census sector. Roughly one third
of the units in the “sample sector” are enumerated every year (changed from a sampling rate
of one-half in 1987-88). Since unit level data on electronic media has only recently become
available to researchers, the unit-level ASI data has been used rarely used in empirical studies.
Previous research using the ASI data has generally been confined to state or industry level
aggregates (e.g., Besley and Burgess [2004]).
Certain limitations of the ASI data have been highlighted in the literature. Pradhan and
Saluja [1998] conclude that the ASI provides “ fairly reliable data” on organized manufac-
turing activity, but “with a considerable time-lag”. Nagaraj (1999) highlights three other
shortcomings of the ASI data: (i) incomplete coverage of factories, (ii) under-reporting of
workers in factories covered, especially in small factories, and (iii) under-reporting of value
added. He indicates that the underreporting may have increased over time. Fortunately, the
questions we address and the difference-in-differences approach we use limit the effects of
these shortcomings in the data. The lag in reporting the data does not affect us as we are
looking at historical data. The under-reporting issues highlighted by Nagaraj do not bias
our difference-in-difference estimates, under the reasonable assumption that the pattern of
under-reporting does not change across the liberalized and non-liberalized groups. In addi-
tion to the ASI, we use various other sources of data on the Indian economy. Data on the
sectors liberalized for FDI investment was obtained from the Handbook of Industrial Policy
and Statistics issued by the Office of the Economic Advisor, Ministry of Industry, Govern-
ment of India. Data on tariff rates were obtained from the World Bank Trade and Production
database. Other data sources used include the annual Economic Surveys published by the
Ministry of Finance, the annual Statistical Abstracts of India published by the CSO, and
data from various government websites. The ASI dataset and the data collected from other
sources were collated and cross-indexed using different concordance tables. Many variables
in the ASI dataset had to be standardized for consistency across the years. A detailed data
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appendix describing the ASI dataset and the various steps undertaken to clean the data is
available on request from the author.
We obtained unit level ASI data for the nine-year period from 1986-87 to 1994-95 from
the CSO. The data is reported on a financial year basis: e.g., the 1986-87 year refers to
the period April 1, 1986 to March 31, 1987. (Hereafter we refer to year 1986-87 as 1987
and so on.) There are about 50,000 firms in every year, yielding about 450,000 firm-year
observations for the full dataset. For our analysis, we restrict attention to industries strictly
in the manufacturing sector.13 We exclude extremely small firms (number of employees 5
or less), as the data on these firms appear to be noisy. This set of small firms constitutes
about 3.75% of the manufacturing sector plants, but represents only 0.06% of total output
(and 0.19% of employment and about 0.91% of total capital).
Further, observations for which real value added, real capital and the labor variables are
less than or equal to zero are excluded from our analysis, because we use logged values
of these variables. White collar labor is equal to zero for a very few cases (0.32% of the
total). The constructed real capital variable is less than zero for 2.5% of the firms. There
are larger number of cases where real value added is less than or equal to zero (14.4% of
firms), with these firms contributing about 10.5% of capital and about 10% of employment.
The distribution of excluded data over different industries and over time, suggests that our
analysis is not severely affected on this account (see discussion in footnote 20 in section B.2).
Finally, since we wish to focus on difference-in-difference estimates, we drop observations
corresponding to four digit NIC industries that appear only for a few years, either fully in
the pre-reform period or wholly in the post reform period.14
The basic characteristics of the subset of the ASI dataset used for our analysis are summa-
rized in Table II(a). As discussed earlier, different segments of the population are sampled
using different sampling frequencies, reflected in the “multipliers” (inverse of sampling fre-
quencies). About half the observations correspond to a multiplier of 3 (2 in year 1987) and
about half belong to the census sector (multiplier of 1). There are on average approximately
37,500 plants in each year, corresponding to a population size of about 71,000 plants. Note
that the sampling scheme changed in 1987, as reflected in the distribution of the multipliers.
In all our analysis, we appropriately weight observations using the multiplier to adjust for
the sampling frequencies.
The summary statistics our key variables are presented in Table II(b) (the definitions of
these variables are discussed below). Most variables are highly skewed, leading to a large
divergence between median and mean values. Since we use logged values or percentage
changes in the variables in our analysis, our results are not significantly affected by the
skewness in the distribution of these level variables. Nevertheless, we check the robustness
13The survey includes firms in some service sectors related to manufacturing, mainly general repair services, which we exclude.
We also exclude the electricity generation and distribution sector. We include the repair of capital goods which is classified as
a manufacturing activity.
14This eliminates only about 1.52% of the firms, but reduces the number of distinct 4 digit industry clusters from about 850
to about 475. Our results are largely unaffected by the exclusion of these plants.
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of our results to dropping outlying observations.
Real value added is measured as the difference between real output and real values of
intermediate inputs (including materials, fuels, and other intermediate inputs and services).
Real output is obtained by deflating nominal output using the relevant wholesale price index
(WPI). Intermediate input deflators were constructed for each industry using industry-wise
WPI and the input-output table from the World Bank’s Trade and Production database.
Labor is measured as the number of employees. Blue collar labor is all production work-
ers, while white collar labor is measured as total number of employees less the number of
production workers.
The dataset provides information on the opening and closing capital for each firm. How-
ever these are historical accounting numbers that are unlikely to conform to the economic
notion of capital. We arrive at the real capital stock for each plant using a two-step pro-
cedure.15 First, we start with the reported capital numbers for 1987, and use the reported
nominal investment data to construct a real capital series at the industry (NIC 4 digit) level
using the perpetual-inventory method. We get real capital stock Kj,t for industry j in period
t from the capital stock in the previous period Kj,t−1 and the real investment in the current
period Ij,t, using: Kj,t = (1− δ)Kj,t−1 + Ij,t. We use a depreciation rate (δ) of 10% (based on
rates used in the literature). The nominal investment values are deflated using the WPI for
plant and machinery. Next, we form the capital stock deflator for each industry as the ratio
of aggregate real capital stock to the aggregate nominal capital stock. The real capital stock
for each firm is then obtained by deflating the nominal stock variable using the constructed
capital stock deflator (as in Harrison [1994]). To capture productivity gains (losses) from
decreases (increases) in inventory, we add real value of inventory to the real capital stock
variable.
The definitions of liberalization variables used in our analysis are explained in Section II
V Effect of product market liberalization on intra-plant productivity
In this section, we analyze the effects of product market reforms (FDI and tariff liberaliza-
tion), on intra-plant productivity levels. We first propose a methodology (based on recently
proposed structural techniques) to identify the production function and estimate total factor
productivity at the plant-level. We then use a difference-in-difference regression framework
to identify the effects of different reforms on total factor productivity (which we define as
the residual from the estimated production function).
A. Methodology
We assume the Cobb-Douglas production function:
vjit = β
j







15Since we have a repeated cross-section (survey) dataset, we cannot construct the capital series directly for each plant.
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where v is the log real value added, l is the log of the number of production (blue collar)
employees, n is the log of the number of non-production (white collar) employees and k is the
log of the real capital employed. We allow the coefficients in the production function to vary
by (2-digit NIC) industry (indexed by j), by estimating the production function separately
for each industry. The index i stands for the firm and t stands for the year. We define total
factor productivity as the residual eit (as in e.g.Olley and Pakes [1996]).
We assume that the productivity residual has two components (we drop the industry
index j from our notation to reduce clutter):
eit = ωit + ηit(2)
where ωit is the component of the productivity shock that is known to the decision-maker
before she makes the choice of inputs (kit, lit and nit), but is unobserved by the econometri-
cian. This “transmitted” component thus leads to a correlation between the input variables
(regressors) and the productivity residual (error term), potentially biasing the coefficients
estimated using the OLS methodology.16 The component ηit, which is assumed to be or-
thogonal to the regressors, captures all other deviations from the hypothesized production
function, arising from classical measurement error, optimizing errors, etc.
To address possible endogeneity of variable inputs, we adapt the structural technique
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin [2003a] (LP) for a panel dataset to our repeated cross-
section setting. A detailed description of our modified LP approach is presented in Appendix
1 (essentially the LP approach uses information from an input choice equation to control
for the endogenous productivity term). We find that, compared to the OLS estimates, the
modified LP procedure yielded higher coefficients on the capital variable, and considerably
lower coefficients on the labor variables, mirroring the findings reported by LP (in the “right
direction” as per Griliches and Mairesse [1995, p19]). The returns to scale estimates are
lower (and close to one) under the modified LP methodology.
The LP methodology solves the endogeneity issue at the cost of placing considerable struc-
ture on the problem. To ensure that our results are not driven by assumptions underlying
the production function estimation methodology,17 we cross-check our results using a range
of alternative approaches for estimating total factor productivity (see section B.2).
To analyze the short-run and longer-term effects of various reforms on intra-firm produc-
tivity levels, we assume the following form for the productivity residual:
eit = αt + αs + β1Dst + β2Dlt + εit(3)
where αt captures year effects, αs captures industry (4 digit NIC code) fixed effects, the
dummy Dst takes on the value 1 if the firm belongs to a liberalized industry and the year is
16The transmitted component could arise from correlation in productivity shocks over time, or due to anticipated shocks to
productivity. See Griliches and Mairesse [1995] for a comprehensive review of the literature addressing this problem.
17One concern could be the reasonableness of the key identifying assumption in equation 11 (see Appendix 1). Further,
given the restrictive and changing regulatory conditions, it is possible that the assumption (implicit in the LP methodology) of
common input and output prices across firms within an industry does not hold for some of the industries in our sample.
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1992 or 1993 (short-run, post-reform), and Dlt takes on the value 1 if the firm belongs to a
liberalized industry and the year is 1994 or 1995 (long-run, post-reform). The coefficient β1
reflects the short-run difference-in-difference (DD) effect of the reform, while β2 reflects the
longer-term DD effect of the reform. The error term εit captures the remaining variation in
productivity residual (including idiosyncratic shocks), and is assumed to be orthogonal to
the liberalization dummies (see discussion in section B.4).
The effects of the various reforms could be analyzed using two alternative approaches.
One, we could consolidate equations 1 and 3, or two, we could adopt a two-stage procedure:
estimate equation 1 in the first stage and run equation 3 in the second stage (using the
coefficients identified in the first stage to define the productivity residual). We find that the
coefficients on the variables of interest are almost identical under the two approaches. Also,
the latter procedure allows for modifying the specification without having to re-estimate the
coefficients (which is extremely computationally intensive under the modified LP procedure).
Hence we present all results using the latter approach.
As pointed out by , the standard errors of difference-in-difference estimators could be
severely biased if we use variation within treatment groups without allowing for the errors
to be correlated within each group. We code liberalization regimes at the 4-digit NIC level
and hence allow for arbitrary correlation structure for the error terms within industries (by
clustering on 4-digit NIC codes).
B. Effects of FDI and tariff liberalization
In this section, we evaluate the effect of FDI and tariff liberalization, on plant-level total
factor productivity. To understand the broad trends in the liberalized and non-liberalized
sectors, we plot the mean productivity levels for the different groups of industries in Figure
III. The graph suggests that the difference in means between the liberalized and the non-
liberalized groups increases after the reforms, especially towards the end of our panel period.
The mean productivity level in the non-liberalized group shows no significant change in the
post-reform period, while the productivity level in the FDI liberalized as well as the tariff
liberalized group shows an upturn after the reforms.
In the next section B.1, we test for changes in productivity using a regression framework
(based on equation 3). In section B.2, we check the robustness of our baseline results to
alternative measures of productivity. In section B.4, we address the potential bias arising
from the selection of certain industries for FDI and tariff liberalization. Finally, in section
B.3, we check the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of the tariff and FDI
liberalization measures.
B.1 Baseline results
Table III presents the regression results for FDI and tariff liberalizations. Our regression
analysis confirms the significance of effects observed in Figure III.
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Regressions 1 and 2 (3 and 4) compare FDI (tariff) liberalized sectors to non-liberalized
sectors (based on equation 3 above). These regressions suggest a difference-in-differences
improvement of 28% (35%) following FDI (tariff) liberalization in the short run, with small
and statistically insignificant effects in the short term.
There is some overlap between tariff and FDI liberalization (7.5% of the firms); in regres-
sions 1 through 4, the changes in the overlapping sectors get attributed completely to one
of the reforms. In regressions 5 and 6, we look at both FDI and tariff liberalizations simul-
taneously. Here we find slightly smaller but still significant improvement in log productivity
in the longer term for the liberalized industries; about 21% for FDI liberalization and about
33% for tariff liberalization. These regressions correctly attribute changes in overlapping
sectors to the respective liberalization dummies.
We conclude that both FDI and tariff liberalizations resulted in significant improvements
in mean intra-plant productivity levels in the liberalized industries. These improvements take
a couple of years to be realized; we find little effect in the two years immediately following
the reforms. We find the delayed effect reasonable since changes required for improving total
factor productivity is likely to involve some lead time. Further, delays could also be due to
concerns by firms about the permanence of the reforms (see discussion in section VIII).
B.2 Robustness to alternative measures of productivity
As discussed in section A., there may be reasons to worry that our results are driven by as-
sumptions underlying the modified LP methodology used to derive the productivity residual
in our base case (Table III). Accordingly, in this section we examine if our results are robust
to various. alternative measurements of the productivity residual. The results are reported
in Table IV(a). We generally find small and insignificant effects in the short run similar to
the base case (Table III). Hence, for the sake of conciseness, we report only on the long-run
effects of the reforms.
First, we use OLS (including industry fixed effects) to estimate the production function
(equation 1). Second, we estimate the residual based on the methodology proposed by Olley
and Pakes [1996], using investment to proxy for unobserved productivity disturbances (we do
not control for exits since this is unidentifiable in our data). Third, we use an instrumental
variables (IV) approach to identify the production function, using as instruments plant level
blue and white collar wage rates (for blue and white collar labor), and debt level and interest
rate as instruments for the capital variable.18
Fourth, considering the skewness in the key variables (see Table II(b)), in order to ensure
that our results are not driven by a handful of extreme values, we redo our analysis after
winsorizing the productivity variable by 2.5% on both tails of its distribution.
18Similar instruments have been used previously in the literature (e.g., Harrison [1994]), but have been critiqued (see Griliches
and Mairesse [1995]). The key concern is that the useful variation in these instruments may be eliminated when we control for
industry or year effects. We do not see this as a superior identification strategy, and use this merely as a cross-check on the
robustness of our results.
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Fifth, we use the commonly used Solow index definition of productivity (valid under the
assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition): log(TFP) = [v − sl.l −
sn.n− (1− sl − sn).k], where v is log real value added, l is log of the number of blue collar
employees, n is log of the number of white collar employees, sl is the share of blue collar
wages in value added and sn is the share of white collar wages in value added. We evaluate
the shares (sl and sn) at the median level within each two digit industry.
Sixth, we use the residual from a gross output production function specification. Our
base case production function specification defines real value added as a function of labor
and capital inputs. This assumes a strong form of separability in intermediate inputs (Bruno
[1978]). To check if our results are driven by the assumption of a value-added specification,
we estimate productivity as the residual from a full production function, i.e. defining real
output as a function of real intermediate inputs (including materials, fuels and other inputs),
labor (blue and white collar) and capital. Given the remarkable consistency of results across
the LP and OLS in the value added specification, for computational convenience we estimate
the full production function using the OLS methodology (allowing the parameters to vary
across 2-digit industries).
Finally, we use labor productivity (defined as log of value added per employee) as an alter-
native measure of productivity. While labor productivity has the drawback of confounding
the effect of technology improvement and factor accumulation, it is commonly used as an
alternative measure of productivity (especially when data on capital is unavailable). Further,
examining this measure would be a check on whether the estimated total factor productivity
improvements are driven solely by measurement error in capital.
We find our results remarkably robust to alternative measures of productivity. Note that
productivity in gross output terms (row 7 of Table IV(a)) is expected to be much lower than
the productivity in value added terms (first six rows of Table IV(a)), and a rough check
suggests that the gross output results are broadly consistent with the value added results.19
In addition to the above, we checked the robustness of our results to using an alternative
definition of capital, allowing production function coefficients to vary between the pre-reform
and post-reform periods, and including other (size and location) fixed effects (results not
reported). We found our results generally robust to these checks too.20
The remarkable robustness of our results across different definitions of productivity is
19 Roughly, the ratio of gross output productivity to value added productivity is the same as the ratio of value added to gross
output (refer footnote 6). Since the mean ratio of value added to output is about 25% in our sample, the gross output effect
here is equivalent to (roughly) a 20% (' 4*0.049) increase in productivity following FDI liberalization and a 24% (' 4*0.059)
increase in productivity following tariff liberalization, in value added terms.
20As noted in section IV, because we use logged variables, we exclude observations where real value added is non-positive.
This leads to the exclusion of poorly performing firms, and potentially biases simple period means upwards. To understand the
implications of this for our difference-in-difference estimates, we analyzed the patterns of non-positive real value added across
the liberalized and non-liberalized samples and over time. We find that the proportion of firms with non-positive value added
is generally higher for the non-liberalized industries and more so in the post-reform period, so that dropping these firms likely
overestimates the productivity improvement in the non-liberalized industries. Thus dropping cases of non-positive value added
is likely to cause an underestimation of the difference-in-difference effects of the FDI and tariff liberalizations. Further, as a
crude check, we replaced the non-positive real value added figures with the minimum positive real value added figures for each
year. We obtained larger but noisier (less significant) difference-in-differences effects.
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consistent with the findings reported by Van Biesebroeck [2003]. As in Van Biesebroeck, we
observe significant differences in coefficient estimates (and hence in returns to scale) across
the OLS, LP, IV and index number methodologies, but our difference-in-difference estimates
of the effect of reforms on productivity are largely unaffected by the particular methodology
used. These findings provide room for cautious optimism about the severity of simultaneity
bias problem on some common types of total factor productivity studies.
B.3 Alternative definitions of liberalization
In this section, we check whether the large and positive effects of FDI and tariff liberal-
ization we estimated in Table III is robust to alternative definitions of the FDI and tariff
liberalization variables. Our results are presented in Table IV(b).
First, we re-examine our definition of FDI reform. In section II, we defined the FDI
reform equal to one for 4-digit NIC codes that corresponded to industries in the Annexure
III list of the Statement of Industrial Policy, 1991. The cross-indexing of the Annexure III
industries was done manually, and could lead to measurement error on the reform dummy.
It is possible that the RBI or FIPB adopted a more liberal classification strategy allowing
FDI into activities that were similar to those listed in Annexure III. Also, firms may have
been able to classify their activities as within the automatic approval list even if they were
reasonably close (even if they did not precisely match at the level of disaggregation we
use). This could lead to a downward bias in our results in Table III (since we exclude some
industries that were actually liberalized). To address this concern, we adopt a more liberal
definition of FDI liberalization, classifying additionally all sub-sectors within a 3-digit NIC
code as FDI liberalized if more than half the plants in the 3-digit industry had been classified
as liberalized under the definition we used for Table III. This leads to about 5% additional
plants being classified as FDI liberalized. Our results (row 2 of Table IV(b)) suggest that
a more liberal definition of the FDI reform variable increases the reform effect from 21% to
about 23% (the statistical significance also increases).
Next, as an alternative to the tariff reform dummy defined in section II, we define a
variable equal to the normalized rank of the drop in tariffs (between 1990 and 1992) faced
by each plant. For this measure, plants in the industries that faced the largest tariff drops
would have a value equal to one, while plants in the industries with the lowest tariff drop
would have a value close to zero (plants in industries with the median drop in tariffs would
have a value equal to 0.5). The results of using this variable (row 3 of Table IV(b)) suggests
a strong and highly statistically significant effect of both the FDI and tariff liberalizations.
The coefficient magnitude (0.67) appears to be consistent with the results in Table III; as
per the definitions used in Table III, the mean value of the rank variable is about 0.3 in the
non-liberalized sectors and about 0.8 for tariff liberalized sectors, suggesting a productivity
increase of about 34% (0.67 *(0.8-0.3)) as we move from the mean non-liberalized to the
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mean tariff liberalized plant.21
The results are similar when we include both the liberal definition of FDI reform and the
normalized rank variable definition of tariff liberalization in the same specification (row 4 of
Table IV(b)).
B.4 Selection of Industries for FDI and Tariff Liberalization
By looking at difference-in-differences, our methodology controls for biases arising from the
selection of certain industries for FDI and tariff liberalization, to the extent that the industry
characteristics that led to the selection had a fixed effect on productivity levels. For example,
pre-existing differences in productivity levels get absorbed by industry fixed effects in our
specification. Further, we control for contemporaneous macro-economic shocks by comparing
changes in the liberalized industries to changes in non-liberalized sectors. For example,
economy wide effects of changes in tax rates or inflation are controlled for by time dummies.
However, our results could be still be driven by selection bias from two reasons. Firstly,
if the choice of industries for liberalization was made on the basis of high pre-reform pro-
ductivity growth, this could give rise to spurious differences in differences improvements in
post-reform productivity levels. Secondly, it could be that industries with certain charac-
teristics that were also selected for liberalization show improvements in productivity either
due to other contemporaneous reforms, or because industries with these characteristics were
poised for productivity improvement (even without the reforms), for some unknown reason.
We translate these two causes into four potential sources of bias for our baseline results:
a) industries with strong pre-reform growth in productivity may have been selectively liberal-
ized; (b) currency depreciation may have benefitted export-oriented industries who may have
been selectively liberalized; (c) liberalization of capital imports may have benefitted capital
intensive sectors, who may also have been selectively liberalized; and (d) industries relatively
farther away from the frontier may have had a greater (or lower) scope for improvement,
and they may have been selectively liberalized.
We try to address these sources of bias in two ways. One, we redo our analysis conditioning
out the effect of variables that control for each of the four sources of bias. This allows us
to identify if there are reform effects after controlling for the improvements experienced by
all industries with the given characteristic. Second, we condition on the propensity score
from a selection model that includes proxies for these sources of bias and additional variables
influencing selection into different liberalization regimes (following Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985)). By conditioning on the propensity score, we test whether the selected industries
21We found our results robust to defining a tariff liberalization dummy equal to 1 for the 25 percentile and the 40 percentile
of plants that experienced the largest drops in tariff between 1990 and 1992. We also attempted using the drop in tariff
rates directly as the measure of tariff liberalization. While we found large effects consistent with other results, these were
not statistically significant. Given the crudeness of available tariff data, we believe this is caused by the noise in the actual
magnitudes of tariffs drops. As discussed earlier, the data we use are unweighted tariff line averages for 4 digit SIC codes
(from the World Bank Trade and Production Database), which we then cross-index with the NIC codes. We believe that the
relative ranks of industries would be a more informative (less noisy) measure of the relative degree of tariff liberalization faced
by different industries.
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show an improvement over-and-above the improvement exhibited by industries that had a
high probability (based on our selection model) of being selected into liberalization treatment.
We control for the effect of pre-reform trends by including an interaction of the growth rate
of the mean productivity in each industry prior to 1991 (“PRE GRW”).22 We control for the
possible positive effect of contemporaneous events on export-oriented sectors by including an
interaction of pre-reform total exports to industry output ratio (“EXP INT”). Similarly, we
control for the effect of the liberalization of capital imports on capital intensive sectors by
including interactions of period dummies with the industry mean log of Capital per Employee
(“CAP EMP”). We control for the distance to frontier by including with period dummies
interacted with the ratio of industry level labor productivity in Indonesia to that for the
same industry in India (“DIS FRON”).23
Our results are presented in columns 1 to 4 of Table IV(c); we focus on the effects in
years 1994 and 1995 as the short-run effects (years 1992-93) are insignificant and generally
unaffected by the inclusion of these controls. In column one, we find that industries with high
pre-reform productivity growth rate showed significant improvement in productivity post-
reform, but this does not reduce the estimated effect of the FDI and tariff reforms. Similarly,
in column two, export oriented industries show improvement in productivity post-reform,
but this has no significant impact on estimated FDI and tariff reform effects. In column
three we find significant improvement in capital intensive sectors after the 1991 reforms;
this reduces the estimated effect of the FDI liberalization from 21% to about 16%, but does
not materially affect the estimated tariff effect. Including the distance to frontier proxy in
column four has no effect on the estimated reform effects. In column five, we include all four
controls, and find that there is a small strengthening of the tariff liberalization effect, while
the FDI liberalization falls by about 6% to 15.6%.
We find these results robust to using alternative measures for capital intensity (capital
share of value added), trade orientation (import share of output) and distance to the frontier
(labor productivity relative to Korea). We conclude that our estimated FDI and tariff
liberalization effects are largely robust to the four sources of bias examined here, subject to
the caveat that part of the FDI effect in Table III could be due to the widespread improvement
in capital intensive sectors, which is possibly due to factors other than the liberalization of
FDI.
In columns 6, 7 and 8, we try to control for the effect of selection into different liber-
alization regimes by estimating a selection model and controlling for the propensity score.
Our selection model is discussed in Appendix 2. In addition to variables to control for the
four sources of bias discussed above, the selection model includes controls drawn from the
22Another way to address the concern about pre-reform trends would be to look at difference-in-difference effect of the reforms
on productivity growth. We do this type of analysis in sections VI and VII, and find robust positive effects on the productivity
growth rates too.
23The idea here is similar to the ”distance to frontier” concept used in other papers e.g., Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti
[2003]. We use the UNIDO data on value added (in dollars) and number of employees. Note that the value added figures here
are not adjusted for industry specific PPP exchange rates, but use the official exchange rate. We also looked at output per unit
labor cost and find very similar results.
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literature on the political economy of trade liberalizations and factors discussed in policy
announcements.24
The results from conditioning on the propensity score are presented in columns 6, 7 and
8 of Table IV(c). The propensity score for FDI liberalization (”FDI PRED”) and for tariff
liberalization (”TAR PRED”) are derived from the selection models in column 5 and column
10 of Table A.I in Appendix 2. Conditioning on the FDI propensity score alone reduces the
FDI effect from 21% to about 18%, while controlling for both the propensity scores reduces
the FDI effect down to 14%. There is no effect on estimated tariff liberalization effect in
these specifications. Again, these results suggest that a part of the effect of FDI estimated
earlier (Tables III) is driven by the characteristics of the industries (possibly high capital
intensity) selected for liberalization.
We conclude that a significant part of the FDI liberalization effect and almost all the
tariff liberalization effect seems unlikely to be driven by non-random selection of industries
for liberalization.25 The results from this exercise must, however, be interpreted cautiously.
Measurement error in the reform variable could bias coefficients on the liberalization variable
downward. The definition of whether an industry is liberalized could be subject to interpre-
tation by local regulatory authorities. For example, in the case of FDI liberalization, some
of the industry with a high propensity score may have received approvals through the FIPB
route (refer section II) more easily. In this case, if non-liberalized industries with a high
propensity score show a large productivity increase, it may be because of these industries
faced greater degree of FDI liberalization than is reflected in our reform measure; then our
coefficient on FDI liberalization in Table IV(c) would be biased downward. On the other
hand, our selection model could be misspecified, as there could be omitted or unobserv-
able variables driving selection into FDI or tariff liberalization.26 Hence, we are wary about
completely ruling out bias arising from the selection of specific industries into the two lib-
eralization regimes, but interpret the evidence as suggesting that estimated effects are not
completely driven by selection bias.
24Our selection model suggests interesting political economy underpinnings for the liberalization process in India. A complete
analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
25Here we attempt to identify reform effects by controlling for potential omitted variables. An alternative identification
strategy could be an instrumental variables approach. If we could identify variables that affected choice of industries into FDI
and tariff liberalization but were uncorrelated with the potential for post-91 change in productivity, we could instrument for
the policy liberalizations using these variables. However, all the variables we identify as affecting selection (see Appendix 2),
such as labor productivity relative to international levels, export-share of output, etc are plausibly correlated with productivity
change. Hence these variables would be poor instruments for the reform dummies, and therefore we try to control for these
variables directly or through the propensity score. We examined other potential instruments (e.g., location of the industries
relative to the political base of the ruling party), but these proved to be weak in the first stage regression (i.e. in explaining
variation in the liberalization variable). The results using these weak instruments support a significant positive effect for both
FDI and tariff liberalizations.
26Including additional predictors in the selection model may not improve the outcome; in the extreme case, if our model
exactly predicted choice into a particular liberalization regime, we could have a collinearity problem, similar to the support
problem highlighted by Heckman et al. (1997).
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VI Analysis of aggregate output and productivity growth
The important role of re-allocation in improving aggregate productivity has been stressed
in empirical studies of productivity in US manufacturing plants (Foster et al. [1998]) and
in recent theoretical work on trade liberalization [e.g. Melitz [2003]. Nickell [1996] points
out that focussing solely on changes in mean intra-plant productivity may be misleading, as
the effect of increased competition could be to spur the re-allocation of resources from less
to more efficient firms. However no empirical studies of trade liberalization have addressed
this question directly [Tybout 2001], and we contribute here to plugging this gap in the
literature.
We first propose a novel decomposition of changes in industry aggregate output growth
into contribution from changes in inputs, reallocation across industries and changes in indus-
try aggregate productivity growth. The change in industry aggregate productivity growth is
further decomposed into a intra-plant component and a term capturing reallocation across
plants within the industry (intra-industry reallocation). Then we estimate difference-in-
difference effects of FDI and tariff liberalization on each component of this decomposition.
A. Methodology
Following from the Cobb-Douglas production function assumed in equation 1, indexing plants









































Thus aggregate output can be viewed as the product of an aggregate input index Ψ̄ and
an aggregate productivity index Θ̄. Note that this aggregate productivity index, unlike those
used earlier in the literature, can be directly related to the aggregate output.27 We can then
decompose changes in aggregate output into changes in the aggregate productivity index Θ̄t










The aggregate productivity index Θ̄t can be further decomposed, as in Olley and Pakes
27 This productivity index is incidentally similar to the one advocated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003b). This paper discusses
the shortcomings in productivity indices and decompositions used in the literature.
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[1996], as follows:28
Θ̄t = θ̄t +
∑
i
(sit − s̄t)(θit − θ̄t) = θ̄t + ρt
⇒ ∆Θ̄t = ∆θ̄t + ∆ρt(6)
Combining equations 5 and 6, in the discrete time case we get the following decomposition
















































where j indexes the industry, and k is the total number of industries.
Thus, change in the average industry-level output growth comes from increases in the
aggregate input index (term 1), or from covariance between changes in the industry aggregate
input index and changes in the industry aggregate productivity index (term 2), or from
change in the mean intra-plant productivity level (term 3), or finally from an increase in the
covariance between intra-plant productivity levels and intra-industry input share (term 4).
Term 4 is commonly interpreted in the literature as arising from (intra-industry) reallocation
of inputs towards more productive plants. Analogously, term 2 can be interpreted as the
component of output growth arising from the reallocation of inputs between industries (inter-
industry reallocation).
We first estimate each component in Equation 7 separately for each 4-digit industry. We
then analyze if the change in each component of output growth is significantly different for the
industries where FDI and tariffs were liberalized, using a difference-in-difference regression
framework similar to equation 3:
Xjt == αt + αs + β1Dst + β2Dlt + εjt(8)
where Xjt is one of the terms on the RHS of equation 7, the dummy Dst, captures the
short run post-reform (1992 and 1993) effect, Dlt reflects the long-run, post-reform (1994
and 1995) effect, and εjt is the error term capturing omitted variables and other residuals.
Note that the terms in the above regression are industry-level (mean) growth rates,
whereas the regression in the previous section looked at plant-level (log) productivity levels.
Hence, these regressions give us difference-in-differences (DD) estimates of the changes in
productivity growth rates in industries that were reformed. However, we must be cautious in
interpreting these DD estimates as permanent changes in growth rates, since these are mea-
sured over relatively short periods and may not be distinguishable from one-time increases
in productivity levels following the reforms (as pointed out by Tybout [2000]).
28This decomposition is critiqued in Levinsohn Petrin (2003b). While the alternative decomposition suggested by them in
the panel context is more informative, we are unable to use that given the nature of our data (repeated cross-sections).
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B. Results
To control for the effect of outliers on our regression analysis, in the baseline specification
we truncate the sales growth variable by 2.5% on both sides of the distribution.29 (We check
the robustness of our results to using different truncation cut-offs, and to using a logged
transformation of the dependent variable.)
The results under our baseline specification are summarized in Table V. In panel 1 we
compare FDI liberalized industries to industries that faced neither FDI nor tariff liberal-
ization. Following FDI liberalization, we find that there was a difference-in-difference (DD)
increase in the growth of output of about 10.2% (not statistically significant) in the short run
(1992-93) driven largely by input growth (4.6%) and by intra-industry reallocation (3.6%).
In the longer term (1994-95), there was a 16.7 % increase in output growth, composed
mainly of aggregate productivity growth (16%). Aggregate productivity growth was in turn
dominated by intra-plant productivity growth (11.6%).
In panel 2 we do the same analysis as above for tariff liberalized industries. The results
here are similar to those for FDI liberalization. There is a statistically insignificant 5.5%
change in output growth in the short-run, contributed to mainly by changes in intra-plant
productivity growth. In the longer term, we find a 12.9% (statistically insignificant) change
in output growth for tariff liberalized industries, driven by mainly by aggregate productivity
growth (15.6%, significant at 5 percent level). Changes in aggregate productivity growth is
in turn driven largely by changes in intra-plant productivity growth (10.6%), and to a lesser
extent by intra-industry reallocation (5.0%).
For both FDI liberalization and tariff liberalization, the statistically significant effects
were changes in aggregate productivity growth, driven by changes in intra-plant productivity
growth. Inter-industry reallocation plays only a minor role, in all the cases, while intra-
industry reallocation plays a larger, but statistically insignificant role.
We cross-checked our results using different truncation cut-offs on the sales growth vari-
able (1% and 5%); while the point estimates varied, the relative importance of the various
components remained largely unchanged. We also examined a log transformation of each of
the components (i.e. we looked at log(1 + Xjt) instead of Xjt in equation 8), which yields
results more robust to dropping outliers. The results using the transformed variables were
qualitatively similar to those under the baseline specification.
We interpret the above results as: (a) providing strong evidence of a positive effect of
lowering entry barriers on aggregate productivity growth, and (b) suggesting that the ag-
gregate longer-term (1994-1995) productivity growth was largely through channels stressed
in representative agent theories (such as adoption of technology or reduction in slack). The
reallocation channel stressed heterogenous firm theories (such as Melitz [2003]) plays an im-
portant role in the short-run, but these effects are small relative to the long-run gains from
intra-plant productivity improvements. We note that the highly restrictive labor laws in
29That is, we drop observations for which sales growth is above 97.5 percentile or below 2.5 percentile.
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India may have dampened the role of reallocations.
VII Beneficiaries from the reforms
A widely debated question in relation to opening markets to global competition (such as
those analyzed here), is who obtains the benefits (if any) from the reforms. In the Indian
context, there is an ongoing debate on the effect of the 1991 reforms on poverty (refer Datt
and Ravallion [2002]). Studies on trade liberalizations in other countries have examined
the impact of trade on labor market outcomes such as labor demand elasticity and wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers (see Epifani [2003]). In this paper, we try
to evaluate who benefited from the long-run improvement in productivity following FDI and
tariff liberalization that we uncovered in the previous sections.
A. Methodology
To address this question, we evaluate a decomposition that relates total factor productivity
change to changes in different price levels. We start with the accounting identity:
P ot .Q
o
t ≡ P it .Qit + W lt .Lt + W nt .Nt + Rkt .Kt
where P ot is the output price at time t, Q
o
t is the real value of output, P
i
t is the input price at
time t, Qit is the real value of inputs used, Lt is the number of blue collar employees, W
l
t is
the blue collar wage rate, Nt is the number of white collar employees, W
n
t is the white collar
wage rate, Rkt is the return to capital, and Kt is the capital employed. R
k
t is not directly
observed; we define Rkt as the residual, assuming the above identity holds.
Taking first differences and defining si ≡ P
iQi
P oQo
, sl ≡ W
lL
P oQo
, sn ≡ W
nN
P oQo
















































In equation 9, the first line corresponds to the Solow index definition of productivity
change. The five terms in the second row represent the decomposition of productivity growth
to (share weighted) growth in input prices (term 1), blue collar wage growth (term 2), white
collar wage growth (term 3), growth in return to capital (term 4) and changes in output
prices (term 5). We interpret equation 9 as the decomposition of productivity gains into
benefits to five groups of stake-holders: (input) suppliers, blue-collar workers, white-collar
workers, owners of capital and consumers.
To operationalize the above decomposition, we aggregate output, employment, capital
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and wages to the industry level.30 For P ot , we use the wholesale price index, while P
i
t is
obtained as a weighted average of the input wholesale price indices (with weights obtained
from the input-output tables). Note that since we use the wholesale price index, price drops
are more precisely interpreted as gains for wholesale rather than retail consumers. We then
examine the effect of FDI and tariff liberalization on each component of the decomposition,
adopting the same regression framework that we used in section VI.
B. Results
The results from the difference-in-difference analysis of each of the sub-components of equa-
tion 9 is presented in Table VI. As in section VI, we find that our point estimates are affected
by outliers. Hence, for our baseline specification, we control for the effect of these outliers
by truncating the data by 2.5% on the both tails of the productivity (δp) distribution.
In panel 1 of Table VI we examine the effect of FDI liberalization and in panel 2, we look
at tariff liberalization. We obtain similar results for both FDI and tariff liberalizations. As in
previous sections, we find no significant effects in the short run post-reform period (1992-93).
There is a significant increase in industry level productivity growth (defined as per the Solow
measure) in the longer-term (i.e. in the years 1994 and 1995): 5.2% for FDI liberalization and
5.1% for tariff liberalization.31 As shown in equation 9, this change in productivity growth
(column 1) can be decomposed into changes in various factor prices (columns 2 to 6). There
is a statistically significant drop in input prices in the liberalized industries in the 1994-95
period (1% for FDI and 0.3% for tariff liberalization). This suggests a reduction in margins
or reduced costs for suppliers of intermediate inputs. The relative increase in productivity
and the drop in input prices appear to translate into relative drops in output prices (4.9%
for FDI and 2.7% for tariff liberalization). The next largest component is gains to capital,
but this is a smaller (and statistically insignificant) proportion of the long-run productivity
improvement. There is almost zero relative change in the share-weighted wages for both blue
and white collar workers in the liberalized industries. We see similar but smaller effects in
the shorter run (1992-93) for both FDI and tariff liberalization.
We checked the sensitivity of our results to using different truncation cut-offs for produc-
tivity growth outliers (δp). Though point estimates vary, the qualitative conclusions remain
the same: following the reforms, there is a long run increase in productivity growth and a fall
in input prices, with the main effect being reduced consumer prices. There is no difference-
in-difference impact on either blue or white collar wage rates. Our qualitative conclusions
are also robust to using log transformations of our dependent variables.
Thus, we conclude that the main beneficiaries from the relative productivity improvement
30With panel data, we could implement the above decomposition at the firm level. Since we have a repeated cross-section
(survey) dataset, we aggregate up to the industry level.
31Note that, as discussed in footnote 6, change in growth rate of 1% in real output terms translates into roughly 4% change
in growth rate of value added (holding inputs constant). Hence the numbers here translate to a change in productivity growth
of about 20% (20%) for FDI (tariff) liberalization in value added terms, which are somewhat higher than the values obtained
for change in value-added aggregate productivity growth using the estimated coefficients in section VI.
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in the reformed sectors were consumers. There is no evidence here of either a beneficial or
detrimental impact of productivity improvements on either blue or white collar workers.32
To the extent that wholesale consumers are not concentrated and/or that wholesale price
drops translate to lower retail prices, these results assuage the concern of some critics that
the benefits of from product market liberalizations may not be widely dispersed.
VIII Discussion of Findings
We draw three broad conclusions from our analysis: (i) there were significant gains in the
mean level of intra-plant productivity, following the FDI and tariff liberalizations. This
result survives tests for biases from measurement of productivity, selection into liberalization
regimes and, measurement of the liberalization variable,; (ii) there was significant change
in aggregate productivity growth in the liberalized industries, and the main channel for
the aggregate productivity growth was intra-plant productivity growth; and (iii) the major
beneficiaries from productivity growth appear to be wholesale consumers (in the form of
lower prices).
A number of factors, based on the institutional peculiarities, the nature of the reforms
and data limitations could affect our estimates or impact the interpretation our results. We
discuss these in detail below.
The key issue in interpreting our estimated effects is the non-random selection of industries
for FDI and tariff liberalization. Section B.4 addresses this issue; our analysis suggests that
selection bias may lead to an overestimate of the effect of FDI reforms, while it does not
affect our estimate of the effect of tariff liberalization. We are wary about interpreting
this as conclusive evidence that the estimated effects are free of further biases induced by
selection; for example there may have been selection on unobservables that we are unable to
control for. However, we believe a conservative conclusion would be that both tariff and FDI
liberalization had large, positive effects on total factor productivity levels in the liberalized
sectors.
Our estimates could be affected if firms expected the reforms to be reversed. Some of the
literature on the political economy of the Indian reforms suggests that the strength of the
reforms were unusual given the weak position of the ruling party in the parliament. Also
there had been a successful resistance and a political backlash to reform initiatives made by
the earlier government, which could have lead to misgivings about the permanence of the
1991 reforms.33 These concerns suggest that our estimates may be biased downward, and
hence does not weaken the conclusions we draw from our analysis.
32These results are generally supported by our analysis of a range of other variables, including wage rates, labor share of
output, return on assets and gross margins. We note that there was an increase in both blue and white collar wages, in the
white collar to blue collar wage ratio, and in the white collar share of output and employment, across all sectors. This is not
reflected in the above analysis, because it captures only relative differences between liberalized and non-liberalized industries.
33 Generally, there has been a political consensus around the reforms, with governments formed by different parties furthering
the reform agenda. There were no hikes in tariff rates until the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party took office in 1997,
and even these were partially rolled back. Thus a rational expectations model would have people expecting the reforms to be
sustained. Refer to Echeverri-Gent [2003] for discussion of the political economy of the Indian reforms.
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The expectation that the FDI and the tariff liberalization reforms would be extended to
other industries could be another factor affecting our estimates. The list of industries where
FDI was permitted above 50% was expanded considerably in 1997, and tariff rates continued
to be reduced across all industries, through the mid to late 90s. This anticipation of reforms
may have encouraged some firms in the non-liberalized industries to begin improving pro-
ductivity (e.g., by adopting technologies or eliminating slack). Again, this concern suggests
that our results understate the effect of the reforms.34
Our empirical strategy could be affected by two measurement issues – lack of information
on capacity utilization and the use of deflated revenue as a measure of output. The former
issue implies that some of the productivity improvements we measure may be a reflection
of enhanced capacity utilization, possibly from demand shocks. To the extent that the
demand shocks were similar in the control groups, we control for the changes arising from
increased capacity utilization. Further, some of the pre-reform under-utilization of capacity
may reflect the inefficiency and distortions of the over-regulated pre-reform regime. For
example, anecdotal evidence suggests that large industrial houses used to obtain licences for
capacity and leave them unutilized to prevent entry of new players (DeLong (2001)). Thus
post-reform utilization of these (strategically) wasted resources may reflect genuine gains
from the reforms.
Using deflated revenues as the measure of output could bias estimation of the production
function, as highlighted by Klette and Griliches [1996]. Two features of the reforms we are
studying mitigate the impact of this problem. One, since the reforms were implemented
at an industry level, we are interested in industry level productivity (mean productivity of
plants within industries as in section V, or industry aggregate productivity measures as in
section VI and VII). While using industry level aggregate price deflators may overstate the
output (and hence productivity) of plants that charge relatively higher prices and understate
the output (and hence productivity) of plants that charge lower prices, the net impact on
the mean industry productivity is likely to be low. Two, in the cases where our price data is
more aggregated than the 4 digit industry level, if we assume that the reforms reduced the
market power of firms in the liberalized industries, so that the price levels in these particular
industries converged towards the mean (aggregated) price index, then output measures in
the pre-reform period are overstated for these industries relative to post-reform. Then our
difference-in- difference estimates of productivity improvements in these industries are biased
downward. Our results on the fall in relative prices following the reforms (section VII) and
results of previous studies suggest that this may be a reasonable assumption.35
The limited role of reallocation that we uncover in section VI should be viewed considering
34There is also the possibility that they continue to enjoy the perks of the protected environment for as long as possible. We
feel this would be unlikely, as even owners/managers contemplating an exit may want to improve the potential sale proceeds
by improving performance.
35A rough check we undertook suggest that margins either fell or remained the same in the liberalized industries, suggesting
that the assumption of convergence of price levels toward the aggregate mean may not be unrealistic. Also Krishna and Mitra
[1998] report a drop in margins post-reform.
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the highly restrictive labor laws in India that limit the reallocation of inputs (Besley and
Burgess, 2004). Also, it is possible that aggregate productivity changes due to reallocation
may take longer to show up in the data. Finally, we note that we are unable here to fully
analyze the role of exit, unlike studies such as Pavcnik [2002], which use plant-level census
data-sets. This is because our survey dataset does not allow us to identify genuine exits.
Our analysis of the beneficiaries from the reforms needs to be qualified by the limitations
of available data. The price data available is at an aggregated level (We have about 120 lines
of price data, for about 450 different four digit industries.). However, since this analysis
focuses on three broad categories of industries, we believe that our conclusions are likely to
be robust to this measurement problem.
IX Conclusion
We interpret our results as a validation of the productivity enhancing effect of reforms
that eliminate barriers to trade and foreign direct investment. Our finding that (wholesale)
consumers were the major beneficiaries from the productivity improvements suggests that
benefits from such reforms may be widely distributed.
The significant role we find for intra-plant productivity improvements in aggregate pro-
ductivity (and output) growth suggests that channels stressed in homogenous firm models
such as reduction of slack (e.g., Schmidt [1997]) or the adoption of new technologies (e.g.,
Aghion et al. [1999]) may have played a relatively important role, in contrast to the predom-
inant role for reallocation suggested in some heterogeneous firm models (e.g., Melitz [2003]).
An interesting extension of this work would be to use additional data to identify the contri-
bution of different channels proposed by the theoretical literature (adoption of technology,
reduction in slack, learning from contact with foreign goods/competitors) to the measured
improvement in productivity in the liberalized sectors.
From a methodological viewpoint, the robustness of our results to alternative approaches
to estimating the productivity parameter is reassuring. This result mirrors results in Van
Biesebroeck [2003] and Pavcnik [2002], and suggests that the choice of methodology in esti-
mating total factor productivity may not significantly impact many common types of inves-
tigations.
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Appendix 1: Estimation algorithm in the L-P methodology
We assume that our value added production function v = f(l, n, k, ω), is part of a more
general production function separable in all intermediate inputs Y = g(f(l, n, k, ω), h(Γ, ω))
where Γ is a vector of intermediate inputs. (Equation 1 is then a Cobb-Douglas parameter-
ization of the function v = f(l, n, k, ω).)
Let ι be one intermediate input, which LP assume has a demand function of the form:ιit =
ιt(ωit, kit). Other possible state variables not explicitly included in the above input demand
function include prices of inputs and output(s). We assume input and output prices are fixed
across firms within the same industry, but allow for the common prices to change over time
by indexing the input demand function by t.36 Assuming monotonicity, i.e. input choice is
strictly increasing in productivity for all relevant capital levels,37 the input demand function
can be inverted to yield an representation for the unobserved productivity: ωit = ωt(ιit, kit).
Then, assuming the monotonicity condition holds, we can estimate the coefficients on the
labor inputs by estimating the following regression:
vit = βllit + βnnit + φt(ιit, kit) + ηit (Step 1)
where:
φt(ιit, kit) = βkkit + ωt(ιit, kit)
We use quantity of electricity consumed ςt as the input proxy ιt. We specify ωt(ιit, kit) as a
polynomial function in its arguments (including the absorbed intercept term and dropping
the firm index i for expositional convenience) as follows:
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where t2 = 1 for years 1990, 1991 and 1992, and t3 = 1 for years 1993, 1994 and 1995.
Identifying the coefficient on the capital variable requires additional assumptions and
a second stage estimation procedure. The moment condition that LP propose uses panel
information to identify the capital coefficient. LP assume that:
E[ki,t. {ωi,t − E[ωi,t|ωi,t−1]}] = 0(10)
36A sufficient condition for this to hold is perfect (or symmetric cournot) competition within an industry. This allows for
symmetric markups (as assumed for example in Harrison [1994]).
37LP show that, given production technology Y = f(K, L, ι, ω) then the five assumptions (i) f(.) is twice continuously
differentiable in L and ι, (ii) investment does not respond to this period’s productivity, (iii) capital is fixed, (iv) firms take input
prices and output prices as given, (v) all cross derivatives exist, along with the condition that fιLfLω > fLLfιω are sufficient
to ensure that the input demand function ι(ω : pl, pι, K) is strictly increasing in ω, i.e. for the monotonicity condition to hold.
29
This follows from a behavioral assumption that capital does not respond to “surprises”
in productivity, or equivalently from assuming that {ωi,t}∞i=1 follows a stochastic first order
Markov process.
The LP methodology could be adapted to a repeated cross-section context by making the
broader assumption that ωi,t is uncorrelated with the choice of capital ki,t (which is arguably
fixed in the short run). This moment condition is discussed by Griliches and Mairesse [1995],
but they suggest this assumption may be too restrictive, as capital is likely to respond to
any persistent component of ωit. Instead we propose a less restrictive moment condition,
which can be used in the repeated cross-section context. Instead of using last period’s
productivity for each firm (unobservable in our data), we use the average productivity in the
previous period for a closely matched industry-location-size cell (observable in our data) as
the predictor for this period firm productivity. This attempts to approximate the moment
condition in equation 10 as closely as possible, given the limitations of our data.38
To implement this approach, we sub-divide the data into industry-location-size cells and
estimate the average productivity for each cell in every period. Then our modified moment
condition replacing equation 10 is given by:








where ji indexes the industry-location-size cell to which firm i belongs, and mji is the number
of observations in cell j.
As in the LP methodology, we then identify the coefficient on the capital variable (βk) by
considering the second step regression:
v∗i,t = βkki,t + E[ωi,t|ω̄i,t−1] + η∗i,t (Step 2)
where v∗i,t = vi,t − (βlli,t + βnni,t) and η∗i,t = {ωi,t − E[ωi,t|ω̄i,t−1]}+ ηi,t.
The specific estimation algorithm to obtain the capital coefficient is as follows:
i. Start with a candidate estimate39 of the capital coefficientβk∗.
ii. From the results of the first stage regression, obtain:
φ̂t = v̂t − β̂llt − β̂nnt
38This is justified by the assumption that firm specific productivity ωit is given by the cell specific productivity ω̄i,t plus a
random mean-zero shock, along with the assumption that the cell specific productivity follows a stochastic first order Markov
process. Then the best predictor for the current firm-specific productivity would be the last period cell specific productivity.
One alternative is to assume that cell-specific fixed effects captures the transmitted component of productivity (ωit). Our
approach is more flexible in that it allows the cell specific mean productivity to vary over time.
39While we could use some clever starting point, since we expect the coefficient on capital to be within the range 0 to 0.6
(the OLS analysis yields capital coefficients in the range of 0.03 to 0.21), we simply search over this range. We cross-checked
the final estimate to ensure that the estimated value is interior to this range.
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iii. Then obtain:
ω̂t = φ̂t − βk∗kt






where mj is the number of observations in cell j.
v. Regress ω̂t on ̂̄ωt−1 and ̂̄ω2t−1 and use the predicted values to form ̂E[ωt|ω̄t−1].
vi. Obtain v̂∗t = vt − β̂llt − β̂nnt.
vii. Form η̂∗t = v̂
∗
t − βk∗kt − ̂E[ωt|ω̄t−1].
vii. Estimate βk by minimizing the sum (over all the firm-year observations) of the squared






v̂∗it − βk∗kit − ̂E[ωit|ω̄it−1]
)2}
As discussed in Levinsohn-Petrin [2003a], a bootstrapping procedure is used to estimate
the standard errors.
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Appendix 2: Models for selection into FDI and Tariff Liberalization
We specify a probit model for selection of industries into FDI and tariff liberalization
regimes, based on observed industries characteristics in the pre-1991 period. As independent
variables, we consider proxies for the four possible sources of bias discussed in Section B.4:
(i) the pre-reform growth rate in mean productivity (PRE GRW); (ii) the ratio of export to
output (EXP INT); (iii) log of capital per employee (CAP EMP); and (iv) the ratio of the
industry-level labor productivity in Indonesia (DIS FRON) to that in India.
The main motivation for including these four variables in the selection model is to ex-
amine whether selection was indeed based on these characteristics, and to ensure that the
propensity score reflects possible selection on these sources of bias. Information in policy an-
nouncements also suggest that these variables could be relevant in the selection model. The
Statement of Industrial Policy (SIP), 1991 indicated that reforms were aimed at boosting
exports and improving the balance of payments situation, suggesting that export orienta-
tion (EXP INT) could be a relevant factor. Further, the SIP 1991 describes the industries
targeted for FDI liberalization under the automatic route, as “high priority industries, requir-
ing large investments and advanced technology”, suggesting the relevance of capital intensity
(CAP EMP) in the selection model.
In the full specification, we add three additional variables: (i) the mean pre-reform produc-
tivity level, as an additional proxy for future growth potential; (ii) the five-firm concentration
ratio (C5), motivated by Stigler-Peltzman theories of regulation suggest that producers in
concentrated industries may be able to successfully lobby for protection; and (iii) the mean
pre-1991 growth rate in wages to proxy for the overall health of the industry (from Lee and
Swagel [1997] who suggest that weak/declining industries may be targeted for protection)
The results from estimating our selection model are summarized in Table A.I. Columns 1
to 5 examines FDI liberalization while columns 6 to 10 look at tariff liberalization (depen-
dent variable reform dummies are as defined in section II. We find that pre-reform growth
in productivity (PRE GRW) is not significant, either singly (columns 1 and 6) or in the full
specifications (columns 4 and 10). Effect of export intensity appears to be negative (sig-
nificant singly in column 2) for choice into FDI reform, and positive (significant singly in
column 7). This suggests that FDI reforms were targeted at import competing industries,
while tariff reforms were targeted at export-oriented industries.
We find that capital intensity is not significant in our selection model specifications, and
contrary to expectation, it appears with a negative sign on the FDI selection models. One
variable that appears very strongly significant is the distance to frontier variable (columns
4, 5, 9 and 10); interestingly, FDI reforms appear to be targeted at industries farther away
from the frontier while tariff reforms targeted industries closer to the frontier. We find high
concentration to be a positive and significant factor in predicting tariff and FDI liberalization;
this may reflect high degrees of protection for these industries prior to the reforms, consistent
with the Stigler-Peltzman theories of regulation. We find that industries selected for FDI
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(tariff) reform had low (high) rates of growth in blue collar wages. Interpreting along the
lines of Lee and Swagel [1997], FDI (tariff) reform appears to be targeted towards (away
from) declining industries. Finally, the pre-1991 productivity levels appear to have relatively
high for industries selected for tariff liberalization (not significant in the FDI specification).
Our results here are robust to using Korea as a benchmark instead of Indonesia, capi-
tal share of output (instead of log capital per employee), import share (instead of export
orientation), and the Herfindahl index (instead of the five-firm concentration ratio).
The propensity score for FDI and tariff liberalization (used in Table IV(c)) are obtained
from specifications in column 5 and 10 respectively.
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Trends in Foreign Direct Investment into India 
(The three vertical lines from left to right indicate the start of the panel period used in this study, the reform 


























Trends in mean productivity levels – liberalized sectors improve compared to non-liberalized 
 
The year just preceding the reforms in July 1991 is omitted to illustrate the pre- and post-reform trends. `FDI Liberalized’ 
represents firms in industries where foreign direct investment was liberalized.  `Tariff Liberalized’ represents firms in 
industries where tariff rates dropped by greater than 33%.  `Non-Liberalized’ represent firms in industries that where 
neither FDI nor tariffs were liberalized.   
TABLE I  
List of largest industries (by number of firms) and the fraction of firms in each regime 
 
FDI Liberalized Tariff liberalized Non-Liberalized 
   
List of 10 largest (by number of plants) industries in each regime 
• Electrical machinery • Plastic products nec • Grain mill products 
• Industrials organic and 
inorganic chemicals 
• Cotton ginning, cleaning and 
baling 
• Structural clay products 
• Industrial machinery (food 
and textile) 
• Spinning and processing of 
man-made textiles fibers 
• Drugs, medicines and allied 
products 
• Industrial machinery (other 
than food and textile)  
• Printing and allied activities 
nec 
• Miscellaneous  non-metallic 
mineral products n.e.c. 
• Motor cars & other motor 
vehicles  
• Raincoats, hats, etc. • Structural stone goods, 
stoneware, stone dressing etc 
• Special purpose 
machinery/equipment 
• Weaving and finishing of 
cotton textiles in handlooms 
• Sawing and planning of wood 
(other than plywood) 
• Containers and boxes of paper 
or paper board 
• Containers and boxes of paper 
or paper board 
• Iron and steel in primary 
/semi-finished forms 
• Machine tools, their parts and 
accessories 
• Machine tools, their parts and 
accessories 
• Indigenous, sugar, from sugar 
cane, palm juice, etc. 
• General purpose non-electrical 
machinery 
• Food products nec • Hand tools and general 
hardware 
• Pulp, paper and paper board, 
including news print 
• Manufacture of knitted or 
crocheted textile products 
• Metal cutlery, utensils and 
kitchenware 
   
Fraction of plants in each regime (1991) 
28.6% 41.0% 37.3% 
 
 
TABLE II (a) 
DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Multiplier 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total 
           
1 19,984 18,571 17,741 18,426 16,575 17,478 16,306 16,956 18,144 160,181 
(1, 2] 25,062 2 5 930 2,900 2,635 2,656 2,435 3,003 39,628 
(2, 3) - - - 939 1,583 1,800 1,393 1,498 1,660 8,873 
3 - 13,923 14,725 15,695 15,685 15,588 16,503 17,407 18,896 128,422 
           
Total 45,046 32,496 32,471 35,990 36,743 37,501 36,858 38,296 41,703 337,104 
 






TABLE II (b) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 FDI Liberalized Tariff Liberalized Non-Liberalized 
 Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
       
Real Value Added 8.02E+06 6.38E+07 4.60E+06 3.19E+07 5.72E+06 8.63E+07 
Capital 2.28E+07 2.11E+08 1.34E+07 2.90E+08 2.10E+07 4.79E+08 
Total Labor 93 447 100 498 73 560 
Unskilled Labor 65 303 82 450 55 442 
Skilled Labor 28 163 18 90 18 136 
 






EFFECTS OF FDI AND TARIFF LIBERALIZATION ON PRODUCTIVITY 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP 
       
Observations 215566 215566 266824 266824 337104 337104 
R-squared 0.39 0.4 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.42 
Adjrsq 0.387 0.397 0.435 0.446 0.411 0.422 
       
FDI_LIB * I_(92-93) -0.029 -0.032   -0.034 -0.037 
 [0.090] [0.090]   [0.083] [0.083] 
       
FDI_LIB * I_(94-95) 0.287 0.283   0.216 0.212 
 [0.094]** [0.094]**   [0.085]* [0.085]* 
       
TAR_LIB * I_(92-93)   0.053 0.054 0.071 0.073 
   [0.118] [0.119] [0.107] [0.107] 
       
TAR_LIB * I_(94-95)   0.351 0.354 0.327 0.330 
   [0.135]** [0.134]** [0.122]** [0.121]** 
       
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (4 digit) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Dependent variable `LP_TFP’ is the total factor productivity estimated using the LP methodology.  `FDI_LIB’==1 if 
automatic approval for FDI investment up to 51% was allowed in the industry in 1991.  .  `TAR_LIB’==1 if the drop in tariff 
rates between 1990 and 1992 was greater than 33%.  `I_(92-93)’ is a dummy for the years 1992 and 1993 and `I_(94-95)’ is a 
dummy for the years 1994 and 1995. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 4 digit NIC level. + indicates significance 






ROBUSTNESS TESTS OF LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF FDI AND TARIFF LIBERALIZATIONS TO 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PRODUCTIVITY 
 
(1) (2) 
Description of alternative measure FDI_LIB TAR_LIB 
   
Baseline specification (From Table III) 0.212 0.33 
 [0.085]* [0.121]** 
   
OLS for estimating the production function 0.202 0.321 
 [0.086]* [0.124]** 
   
Olley-Pakes methodology for estimating the production function 0.212 0.349 
 [0.087]* [0.131]** 
   
Using IV for identifying the production function 0.196 0.323 
 [0.090]* [0.133]* 
   
Winsorizing dependent variable by 2.5%  0.205 0.317 
 [0.082]* [0.117]** 
   
Using a productivity index definition (Value Added) 0.256 0.375 
 [0.085]** [0.117]** 
   
Using a gross output specification (OLS) 0.049 0.061 
 [0.023]* [0.036]+ 
   
Labour productivity [Log (Value added) – Log(Employment)] 0.185 0.319 
 [0.090]* [0.133]* 
   
 
Reported numbers are the coefficient on a liberalization dummy interacted with I_(94-95) , a dummy for the years 1994 and 
1995.  All regressions include interactions of liberalization dummies with a dummy for years 1992 and 93 (I_(92-93), not 
reported for conciseness.  All regressions also include industry, year and state fixed effects.  `FDI_LIB’==1 if automatic 
approval for FDI investment up to 51% was allowed in the industry in 1991.  `TAR_LIB’==1 if the drop in tariff rates 
between 1990 and 1992 was greater than 33%.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 4 digit NIC level.  + indicates 





ROBUSTNESS TESTS OF LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF FDI AND TARIFF LIBERALIZATIONS TO 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF FDI AND TARIFF LIBERALIZATION 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Description of robustness test FDI_LIB FDI_LIB TAR_LIB TAR_LIB 
     
Baseline specification (From Table III) 0.216 0.212 0.327 0.33 
 [0.085]* [0.085]* [0.122]** [0.121]** 
     
Liberal definition of FDI reform 0.23 0.226 0.334 0.338 
 [0.084]** [0.084]** [0.121]** [0.121]** 
     
Normalized rank of tariff drop  0.223 0.218 0.671 0.672 
 [0.085]** [0.085]* [0.235]** [0.234]** 
     
0.231 0.226 0.687 0.687 Liberal FDI definition and normalized rank of 
tariff drop [0.085]** [0.085]** [0.235]** [0.234]** 
     
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (4 digit) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Dependent variable is `LP_TFP’, the total factor productivity estimated using the L-P methodology.  In the baseline 
specification, `FDI_LIB’==1 if automatic approval for FDI investment up to 51% was allowed in the industry in 1991 and 
`TAR_LIB’==1 if the drop in tariff rates between 1990 and 1992 was greater than 33%. Refer the text for the definitions of 
FDI_LIB and TAR_LIB in the other specifications.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 4 digit NIC level.  + 
indicates significance at 10% level, * indicates significance at 5% level and ** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
TABLE IV(c) 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS OF LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF FDI AND TARIFF LIBERALIZATIONS TO INCLUSION 
OF OTHER PERIOD SPECIFIC CONTROLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP LP_TFP 
         
FDI_LIB * I_(94-95) 0.207 0.215 0.162 0.213 0.156 0.181 0.211 0.143 
 [0.081]* [0.087]* [0.083]+ [0.084]* [0.078]* [0.082]* [0.086]* [0.081]+ 
         
TAR_LIB * I_(94-95) 0.333 0.321 0.359 0.327 0.365 0.371 0.306 0.339 
 [0.119]** [0.129]* [0.118]** [0.112]** [0.108]** [0.121]** [0.126]* [0.122]** 
         
PRE_GRW* I_(94-95) 0.766    0.743    
 [0.254]**    [0.278]**    
         
EXP_INT* I_(94-95)  0.048   0.037    
  [0.020]*   [0.026]    
         
CAP_EMP* I_(94-95)   0.929  0.872    
   [0.364]*  [0.357]*    
         
DIS_FRON* I_(94-95)    -0.017 0.034    
    [0.095] [0.104]    
         
FDI_PRED* I_(94-95)      0.484  1.175 
      [0.313]  [0.367]** 
         
TAR_PRED* I_(94-95)       0.278 0.885 
       [0.277] [0.306]** 
         
Observations 337037 332076 337104 330003 330003 329993 329993 329993 
R-squared 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Adjrsq 0.428 0.41 0.423 0.417 0.417 0.41 0.41 0.411 
 
All regressions include interactions of variables with a dummy for years 1992 and 93 (I_(92-93), which is not reported for 
conciseness. All regressions include industry, year and state fixed effects.  Dependent variable is `LP_TFP’, the total factor 
productivity estimated using the L-P methodology.  `FDI_LIB’==1 if automatic approval for FDI investment up to 51% was 
allowed in the industry in 1991.  `TAR_LIB’==1 if the drop in tariff rates between 1990 and 1992 was greater than 33%. Refer 
text for definitions of other variables.    Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 4 digit NIC level.  + indicates 
significance at 10% level, * indicates significance at 5% level and ** indicates significance at 1% level.  a indicates significance 
at 15% level.   
TABLE V 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES OF THE COMPONENTS OF OUTPUT GROWTH 
 



















       
Panel 1: FDI liberalization effect     
       
FDI_LIB* I_(92-93) 0.102 0.046 0.005 0.051 0.015 0.036 
 [0.086] [0.054] [0.034] [0.058] [0.050] [0.043] 
       
FDI_LIB* I_(94-95) 0.167 -0.001 0.009 0.16 0.116 0.044 
 [0.083]* [0.055] [0.037] [0.057]** [0.045]** [0.044] 
       
Observations 1819 1819 1819 1819 1819 1819 
R-squared 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.06 0.13 
       
Panel 2: Tariff liberalization effect     
       
TAR_LIB* I_(92-93) 0.055 0.000 0.002 0.054 0.049 0.004 
 [0.099] [0.062] [0.041] [0.060] [0.054] [0.043] 
       
TAR_LIB* I_(94-95) 0.129 -0.033 0.005 0.156 0.106 0.05 
 [0.102] [0.063] [0.043] [0.063]* [0.050]* [0.043] 
       
Observations 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.34 0.14 0.11 0.2 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
`FDI_LIB’==1 if automatic approval for FDI investment up to 51% was allowed in the industry in 1991.  `TAR_LIB’==1 if the 
drop in tariff rates between 1990 and 1992 was greater than 33%.  `I_(92-93)’ is a dummy for the years 1992 and 1993 and 
`I_(94-95)’ is a dummy for the years 1994 and 1995.  `Output growth’ is the growth in industry aggregate value added. `Input 
Growth’ is the growth in an industry aggregate input index Inter-industry reallocation is the covariance between growth in 
industry aggregate input index and the growth in industry aggregate productivity index.  `Aggregate productivity growth’ 
is the growth in industry aggregate productivity index.  `Intra-plant productivity growth’ is the growth in the industry 
aggregate productivity index resulting from change in mean firm level productivity.  `Intra-industry reallocation’ is the 
growth in the industry aggregate productivity index attributable to change in the covariance between intra-plant 
productivity and the plant level input index.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 4 digit NIC level.  + indicates 
significance at 10% level, * indicates significance at 5% level and ** indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
TABLE VI 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES OF THE BENEFICIARIES OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
 























       
Panel 1: FDI liberalization Effect    
       
FDI_LIB* I_(92-93) 0.012 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.025 
 [0.019] [0.002]** [0.002] [0.002] [0.017] [0.011]* 
       
FDI_LIB* I_(94-95) 0.052 -0.01 -0.003 0.002 0.014 0.049 
 [0.017]** [0.001]** [0.003] [0.001] [0.017] [0.009]** 
       
Observations 1941 1941 1941 1941 1941 1941 
R-squared 0.10 0.55 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.21 
       
Panel 2: Tariff liberalization Effect     
       
TAR_LIB* I_(92-93) 0.039 -0.009 0.002 -0.001 0.008 0.04 
 [0.019]* [0.002]** [0.003] [0.002] [0.016] [0.011]** 
       
TAR_LIB* I_(94-95) 0.051 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.027 0.027 
 [0.018]** [0.002]* [0.004] [0.002] [0.017] [0.009]** 
       
Observations 2059 2059 2059 2059 2059 2059 
R-squared 0.13 0.53 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.18 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
`FDI_LIB’==1 if automatic approval for FDI investment up to 51% was allowed in the industry in 1991.  `TAR_LIB’==1 if the 
drop in tariff rates between 1990 and 1992 was greater than 33%.  `I_(92-93)’ is a dummy for the years 1992 and 1993 and 
`I_(94-95)’ is a dummy for the years 1994 and 1995.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 4 digit NIC level.  + 















PROBIT MODELS OF SELECTION INTO FDI AND TARIFF LIBRERALIZATION REGIMES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 FDI_LIB FDI_LIB FDI_LIB FDI_LIB FDI_LIB TAR_LIB TAR_LIB TAR_LIB TAR_LIB TAR_LIB 
PRE_GRW (Pre-91 growth in 
mean productivity) -0.189    -0.003 -0.08    -0.238 
 [0.138]    [0.189] [0.128]    [0.170] 
EXP_INT (Export to output 
ratio)  -0.303   -0.204  0.29   0.196 
  [0.166]+   [0.165]  [0.122]*   [0.138] 
CAP_EMP (Log capital per 
employee)   -0.183  -0.252   0.232  -0.555 
   [0.448]  [0.549]   [0.429]  [0.538] 
DIS_FRON (Log Indonesian 
to Indian labor productivity)    0.484 0.445    -0.587 -0.619 
    [0.099]** [0.107]**    [0.101]** [0.109]** 
Pre-91 mean productivity     -0.115     0.191 
     [0.077]     [0.072]** 
Mean blue collar wage 
growth     -0.887     0.559 
     [0.360]*     [0.291]+ 
Concentration ratio (C5)     0.683     0.949 
     [0.296]*     [0.293]** 
Constant -0.345 -0.292 -0.131 -0.576 0.401 0.011 -0.041 -0.254 0.239 -1.297 
 [0.060]** [0.063]** [0.575] [0.077]** [0.999] [0.058] [0.061] [0.550] [0.074]** [0.964] 
           
Observations 465 467 478 456 443 465 467 478 456 443 
Log Likelihood -303.79 -303.2 -311.62 -286.21 -270.65 -322.11 -318.68 -330.91 -298.08 -277.64 
 
`FDI_LIB’==1 if automatic approval for FDI investment up to 51% was allowed in the industry in 1991.  `TAR_LIB’==1 if the drop in tariff rates between 1990 and 
1992 was greater than 33%.   + indicates significance at 10% level, * indicates significance at 5% level and ** indicates significance at 1% level. 
